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Abstract 
The article takes a look at the issues of the market-oriented power sector reform 
and the experience that is of interest in the process of reforms in any country. 
Organizational models might, however, vary quite substantially in different 
countries in terms of basic characteristics. 
     The article studies the difference between idealistic notions that underlie the 
existing market model and real economic relations that are directly connected to 
the technological features of the industry. It validates proposals for alternative 
energy market models and a management mechanism for the industry. 
Keywords: power sector reform, energy market, electricity prices. 
1 Introduction 
Over the past ten years, profound market transformations have been 
accomplished in Russia's electric power sector. A complex energy market 
infrastructure has been created; vertically integrated utilities have been 
unbundled and new joint-stock companies have been established in various areas 
of business; a whole cluster of market-oriented professionals has emerged. 
Nevertheless, the changes in the industry have not been supported by the public.  
     Analysis shows that a number of serious mistakes were made when 
implementing the transformations. 
     The qualitative characteristics of the macroeconomic environment that the 
industry exists in were ignored. The environment has so far been extremely 
ineffective; it is determined by a very bad investment climate and an 
underdeveloped finance and credit system; a considerable impact of external 
factors on electricity prices; the low capacity of mass market consumers to pay; 
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the lack of a full-fledged market in the fuel industries and power plant 
engineering; a frequent change of the rules of operation on the energy market 
that confuses market participants. 
     A forward-looking decision about the target model of a market-driven power 
sector reform that was based on international experience has proved to be 
irrelevant due to the lack of a developed competition environment, a Russia-
specific trend towards establishing affiliated businesses; manufacturers lacking 
interest in providing maintenance support services and, as a result, an influx of 
unqualified market participants [1]. 
     When a spot market was introduced, conditions had not been created for its 
effective functioning. These include the availability of surplus capacity as a 
prerequisite for competition; the removal of operation and transmission 
constraints; the elimination of the capacity structure impact on prices; the 
feasibility of decommissioning uncompetitive power plants. For example, in 
some networks with a high share of hydroelectric power plants, coal-fired 
thermal power plants determine the marginal cost of production, artificially 
boosting the cost efficiency of hydropower plants. 
     There was an idealistic view of the market behaviour of business entities 
(owners, investors, consumers). It was naive to think that the management would 
be guided by signals from the competitive market, and in the first place, from the 
day ahead  market. 
     It was a wrong decision to grant thermal power plants, nuclear power plants 
and heat and power plants privileged access to the spot market (day ahead 
market) and in competitive bidding for power supply, with their fixed costs being 
covered centrally. 
     It was also a mistake to exaggerate the readiness of state regulators and 
industry governance to resolve the key contradiction – between maintaining the 
appropriate level of reliability and pursuing a profit. 
2 The issue of electricity prices  
The author holds the following opinion on the issue of electricity prices that is 
fairly painful for Russia. 
1. Regulation, no matter how thorough and transparent it is, can never 
fully replace cost competition; it can only supplement a free price 
system.  
2. It is economically inappropriate to directly compare electricity prices 
(tariffs) with those in other countries. Only comparable cases can be 
considered, but they are effectively nonexistent. 
3. The battle for low  prices leads to extremely negative consequences. 
First of all, to investment degradation of energy suppliers: they are 
unable to attract investment in their modernization and development 
programmes (if government subsidies or tax concessions are 
unacceptable, as is the case in Russia, and cheap credit is not available 
or limited). Secondly, low prices definitely discourage energy 
efficiency, which is a major problem in Russia; there is no doubt about 
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that. Thirdly, amid overall inflation as well as rising fuel (gas) prices 
and the increasing cost per 1 kW of installed capacity, price controls are 
fraught with dangerous consequences in the short run: an inevitable 
price explosion for all consumers. It would be much harder to cope with 
than a more or less steady (continuing) price growth.   
4. The level of electricity prices is determined by country-specific factors 
such as: 
 the structure of generation capacity and fuel mix; power grid parameters 
and layout; 
 the rate of concentration in production and centralization of 
management;  
 the organizational and economic model of the market for electricity, 
capacity, maintenance and other services;  
 the intensity of competition and its structure on the market; 
 the accepted methods and effectiveness of price controls; 
 sources of funding to cover investment costs. 
     On the other hand, a price growth occurs, for example, due to high inflation in 
the country, growing prices of fuel for thermal power plants and a higher per-
unit cost of construction of energy facilities (as a result of growing domestic and 
world prices of equipment and materials). 
     Consequently, a price growth caused by external factors can undermine any 
attempt to bring prices down using organizational tools (such as restoring a 
vertically integrated structure, expanding tariff control areas etc.). By the way, 
the cost-driven optimization of load management will be of little help if surplus 
generation is not maintained at the level that is required for dispatch decisions 
(there is an obvious parallel with the spot market mechanism).  
5. The optimal electricity price should be calculated with the help of such 
criterion as the nominal payback period for investment in advanced 
energy technologies that are acceptable for potential investors in the 
field of energy production and transmission as well as in the field of 
energy consumption. If the calculated payback period for a new cutting-
edge power plant considerably exceeds the benchmark, the price can be 
considered too low and as hampering the development of the industry. 
On the other hand, if the payback period of energy conservation projects 
is too short compared to the benchmark, it means that the price is too 
high and that it will hold back the introduction of progressive power 
intensive technologies in manufacturing, i.e., the expansion of 
electrification. 
3 Investment shortage 
Many problems of the Russian electric power industry are rooted in the lack of 
effective investment risk management. It is a set of measures aimed at reducing 
investment risk and distributing it fairly among the market participants: owners 
of energy facilities, electricity consumers and the state. 
Energy Production and Management in the 21st Century, Vol. 1  21
 
 www.witpress.com, ISSN 1743-3541 (on-line) 
WIT Transactions on Ecology and The Environment, Vol 190, © 2014 WIT Press
     In a basic market model, the main part of the risk lies with private business. 
As it did not work out in the general case, attempts are being made to pass off 
the risk to consumers, hoping for fair  state regulation of prices (tariffs). In this 
case two scenarios seem most probable: the industry will either be stripped of 
funds not only for its development, but also for staying operational, or tariffs will 
start to grow rapidly, blocking economic growth. The advocates of this approach 
should be reminded about the experience of rigorous state regulation of the 
electricity sector (that operates in a highly effective market environment) in the 
USA where comprehensive control over utilities' costs and income was criticized 
for being too expensive, subjective and sluggish [2].  
     Apparently, the most logical solution would be to find a rational distribution 
of risk, although the task will be hard to be accomplished overnight and in full. 
The best way would be to distribute the relevant types of risk between the state 
and electricity businesses, relieving consumers of these costs that add to prices 
(as consumers already take a risk when they choose suppliers). 
     Thus, a certain part of investment risk should be taken on by the state in two 
aspects: a) by guaranteeing and stimulating private investment; b) through direct 
funding of individual investment projects (a strictly limited number). There 
arises a question about sources of financing. One must not be guided by the 
government budget (i.e., tax payers' money) only due to political as well as 
social and economic reasons. It would be reasonable to opt for raising funds 
from individuals and organizations in the form of energy bonds (which will be 
repaid from future electricity sales revenue). (This source of financing should, of 
course, not be viewed as the only, but a priority one.) But there are two difficult 
problems: that of ensuring truly attractive borrowing conditions and of people's 
trust in state institutions. The latter problem is a key one that needs to be worked 
on intensely through all communication channels. 
     The priority areas for spending the raised funds are on guaranteeing and 
encouraging investment in modernization, overhauls and new capacity. It is 
recommended that special attention should be paid to various small and medium-
sized power generating facilities that position themselves as independent 
generators. 
4 Regional factor 
Conditions for the development and operation of the electricity sector in Russia 
vary regionally a lot more than in any other country. It shows in different 
structures of generation capacity, consumption, energy intensity of 
manufacturing, electric power systems, etc. 
     The pace of economic growth in the regions might vary (from growth to 
recession). Consequently, electricity grid load will be different: some regions 
will have an energy surplus, while others will have a capacity deficit. As a result, 
the attitude to energy efficiency among consumers will be different. For regions 
that enjoy economic growth energy conservation and demand-side management 
will be of major relevance. Others will have surplus capacity and will need to 
reallocate energy, which will require reinforcement of intergrid connections. 
22  Energy Production and Management in the 21st Century, Vol. 1
 
 www.witpress.com, ISSN 1743-3541 (on-line) 
WIT Transactions on Ecology and The Environment, Vol 190, © 2014 WIT Press
”“
Different energy market models and state regulation policies will need to be 
adopted, too. 
5 Prospects of the established energy market model 
The author believes that one should not abandon the basic principles of the 
adopted market model, but it needs to be made more flexible in certain aspects. 
For example, if the purpose is to make access to the market open and 
nondiscriminatory for participants, the established spot market should essentially 
be preserved as the most democratic. At the same time it is possible to discuss its 
suitable scale in various regions, the structure of generators in terms of their 
homogeneity, the pricing mechanism, consumers  involvement and regulation 
principles. 
     More or less the same can be said about the capacity market. One should 
understand that on an organized market it is necessary to somehow cover the 
fixed costs of generators, especially if spot market bids only incorporate variable 
costs.  
     For the capacity market not to discredit itself as yet another failed innovation, 
it is necessary, first of all, to ensure its optimal interconnection with the 
electricity market (spot market). Minimized capacity and electricity charges for 
bulk buyers will be a tangible proof of it.  
     What is undoubted is the focus on developing a market for non-regulated 
bilateral contracts for the supply of electricity and capacity. Exchange-traded 
contracts are of particular importance here due their highest degree of protection.  
     As for the situation with retail markets, it seems most likely that in the 
foreseeable future some retail markets will remain practically monopolistic, that 
is, regulated as refers to electricity retailers. Indeed, in the current Russian 
setting it is better to have one major financially stable and socially responsible 
power supply company, than several dubious young  suppliers imitating 
competition. When necessary external prerequisites emerge, the markets could 
also be liberalized. 
Nevertheless, free prices for electricity and capacity should fully spread from 
the wholesale market to the retail one. An exception should be made for low-
income households and a limited group of socially important customers for 
whom the regulator will set discounted prices, with the concession being covered 
with public funds. Regional electricity retailers should be rewarded for signing 
bilateral contracts with generators at prices that are lower than those on 
organized electricity and capacity markets. At the same time, it is necessary to 
increase the range of end users who are granted the status of wholesale market 
participants.  
We should note that positive changes in the external environment such as 
growth in personal income, energy conservation efforts and higher profitability 
of non-energy business will help to reduce regulation on the wholesale and retail 
markets, switch  the market into full operation mode and realize the potential of 
social efficiency that is incorporated in the target energy market model. 
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6 Taking account of the Russian experience in developing 
countries 
The development of competitive markets for the electric power industry is a 
global progressive trend. It is commonly believed that it boosts private 
investment and at the same time optimizes electricity prices as well as ensures 
rational consumer choice. Country-specific models of the sector's organization, 
however, differ quite drastically in terms of: 
 the readiness level in the external environment; 
 ownership of energy assets; 
 the level of vertical integration in power companies; 
 peculiarities of price and investment regulations; 
 competition mechanisms; 
 the ability of consumers to freely choose a power supplier. 
The electricity market is universally an artificial construction based upon 
various organizational and economic models that are designed and implemented 
under the aegis of national governments. 
Investment inertia of energy facilities, security of electricity supply and the 
political expediency of industry regulation (environmental and social) are the 
factors that restrict the flexibility of the electricity market and limit the scale of 
liberalization of the energy markets (compared to conventional naturally 
competitive commodity markets). 
Implementing one or another energy market model requires certain 
economic, technological and social prerequisites. For example, in order to create 
a competitive environment, it is necessary to constantly maintain capacity 
surplus on the wholesale market; ensuring the uninterrupted and smooth 
operation of the market requires modern up-to-date software, IT and 
telecommunication solutions. 
The quality of the economic environment has a particular importance. It is 
determined by such key parameters as the overall investment climate in a 
country, the development of competition on commodity markets supplying 
resources to the electric power generation industry; the population's purchasing 
power; the professional competence of workers. The predominantly negative 
experience of the Russian power sector reform offers tangible proof of the need 
to adhere to these parameters [3]. 
Over the past few years, technological innovations have emerged or are being 
designed in the electric power industry of some developed countries that will 
probably require relevant adjustments to the existing electricity market models. 
To be more precise, these are distributed generation (especially based on 
renewable energy sources) and smart  grid projects. For example, RES that are 
uncompetitive economically, but environmentally friendly are given priority 
when the system operator dispatches generating units, which, by the way, ruins 
the entire mechanism of competitive pricing on the wholesale market. 
When choosing an energy market model, it is advisable for developing 
countries to preserve to a certain degree the vertically integrated structure of 
functions in electric power companies (in the limit – in the form of a holding 
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company). At the same time, special attention should be paid to competition in 
the field of building new generation assets (i.e., in investment), rather than in 
operation. 
Of all other common options, the single buyer  ( purchasing agency ) 
model appears to be the most suitable one for developing markets. The role of 
the single buyer is played by a partly integrated national utility company; it is 
this company that organizes competition among generators and independent 
producers on the wholesale market.  
As the introduction of a market system in the electric power industry fell 
short of expectations, in many countries there has been an increased interest in 
microgeneration, distributed generation (RES, gas turbine units, reciprocating 
engine units, small steam turbine plants, NPPs of up to 150 MW). Such power 
production makes it possible to bring down the cost per unit, put new assets into 
operation, has a short payback period, it is reliable and flexible. At the same 
time, a number of negative occurrences could be observed. 
The place and functions of microgeneration in the power sector of a country 
is yet to be determined, and more importantly, institutional mechanisms for 
managing its development have not been devised and adopted. As a result, the 
development of microgeneration (distributed generation) has so far been 
spontaneous and sporadic and is mainly driven by the enthusiasm of local 
authorities and head of companies who are all trying to address of the issue of 
power supply in their own way. 
A lot is being said today about the technical and economic advantages of 
various small units, but there have been practically no systemic proposals for 
exploiting the combined efficiency potential of microgeneration as an element of 
the country's electric power sector. 
Microgeneration should be viewed as a progressive technical base for 
building a regional power production framework that carries out a set of anti-
crisis tasks in power supply amid numerous risks brought about by the 
liberalization of the electricity market.  
When reforming the electric power sector, special attention should be paid to 
the training of qualified managerial personnel. An influx of managers who are 
not familiar with the basics of energy technology, who lack the understanding of 
its most complex interdisciplinary relationships with business results and of the 
priority of the security of supply leads to a sharp decline of professionalism in 
the sector management and negative consequences. 
7 Conclusion 
The author has defined and validated the main reasons why the power sector 
reform in Russia led to unsatisfactory results. 
On the basis of these causes, areas for improvement of competition and 
market environment have been determined and proposed models of the industry 
development have been substantiated.  
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